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Abstract: When startups innovate, does the surrounding area prosper? Exploiting quasi-random assignment of patent examiners with varying leniency, we show that patent grants to startups increase nearby annualized real estate returns by 0.4 to 0.6 percentage points for residential properties and 0.5 to 0.9 percentage points for commercial properties and vacant land. Effects are largest for the first successful startup in an area and decline with additional successes. We also find that patent-granted startups spur nearby patenting, establishments, and jobs. Yet these real effects emerge only over the following decade, while real estate return premia appear immediately.

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Abstract: Housing supply is shaped by land availability, construction costs, regulations, and administrative barriers. Using parcel, zoning, and construction cost data for Greater Boston, I examine how these constraints jointly shape single-family development. I develop a discrete-choice model where landowners choose whether and what to build and estimate that implicit development costs beyond formal zoning add $117,000 per project at the median, plus $45,000 for nonconforming development. Counterfactuals show that reducing the per-project development cost by $50,000 raises supply by 73-79% and removing minimum lot size requirements raises supply by about 27%. Individually these reforms lower prices by 1% or less, but combined they raise supply by 130-140% and lower prices by about 2-4%, indicating that the largest affordability gains come from relaxing multiple constraints together rather than any one in isolation.

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Abstract: We study how the design of rental subsidies shapes landlord behavior in the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program, the largest rental assistance program in the United States. We focus on how the program's rent ceiling, known as the payment standard, shapes landlords' price-setting and tenant selection decisions, which in turn affect the neighborhood outcomes of voucher holders and the program's overall cost. Combining administrative data on all voucher holders with nationwide rental listings, we document bunching patterns in both contract and listed rents at payment standards. We then apply bunching estimators to disentangle the motivations behind landlord pricing behavior. Additionally, we examine potential ``overcharging,'' in which landlords raise rents to the payment standard or above listed prices to capture additional subsidy. Finally, we assess how these behaviors vary across neighborhood contexts. Our findings underscore the importance of subsidy design in shaping landlord participation, price-setting practices, and the overall effectiveness of the HCV program.

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Abstract: The Housing Choice Voucher program provides substantial rental subsidies to low-income households, yet many recipients struggle to secure housing with their vouchers, particularly in low-poverty areas. This paper examines a key bottleneck in the program: landlord discrimination against voucher holders. Using a nationwide dataset from a major online rental platform, we identify listings that explicitly seek or reject voucher holders. We find significant variation across metropolitan areas, with voucher-seeking listings ranging from nearly zero to 18 percent and voucher-rejecting listings ranging from nearly zero to 28 percent. Within metros, landlords in high-poverty neighborhoods with larger Black and voucher populations are more likely to seek voucher holders, while rejection of voucher holders is relatively more common in low-poverty neighborhoods. Using a difference-in-differences design, we provide causal evidence that statewide prohibitions on source-of-income discrimination significantly reduce explicit rejection of vouchers. This reduction is particularly pronounced in low-poverty neighborhoods and can eliminate cross-neighborhood disparities in discriminatory behavior.